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European Central Bank working paper series 38Abstract
In this paper we incorporate a labor market with matching frictions and wage
rigidities into the New Keynesian business cycle model. In particular, we analyze
the eﬀect of a monetary policy shock and investigate how labor market frictions
aﬀect the transmission process of monetary policy. The model allows real wage
rigidities to interact with adjustments in employment and hours aﬀecting inﬂation
dynamics via marginal costs. We ﬁnd that the response of unemployment and
inﬂation to an interest rate innovation depends on the degree of wage rigidity.
Generally, more rigid wages translate into more persistent movements of aggregate
inﬂation. Moreover, the impact of a monetary policy shock on unemployment and
inﬂation depends also on labor market fundamentals such as bargaining power and
the ﬂows in and out of employment.
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Matching Models, Labor Market Search, Inﬂation Per-
sistence, Real Wage Rigidity
JEL classiﬁcation: E52, J64, E32, E31
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November 2005Non-technical Summary
Europe’s labor markets are characterized by ﬁring costs, generous unemployment
beneﬁts and strong unions that are perceived to contribute to sluggish labor mar-
ket adjustments. Moreover, the collective wage bargaining process is seen to pre-
vent wages from adjusting instantaneously, introducing a substantial degree of wage
rigidity. Therefore, rigidities and frictions in the labor market might be crucial for
understanding sluggishness in ﬁrms’ marginal cost and their price setting behavior.
In this paper, we stress the role of the labor market in determining ﬁrms’ marginal
cost and link labor market adjustments directly to the dynamics of inﬂation. For
that reason, we introduce a labor market model with matching frictions into the New
Keynesian business cycle framework. We particularly introduce a model with right-
to-manage wage bargaining to incorporate a real wage rigidity in form of a social wage
norm which has important implications for the joint dynamics of unemployment and
inﬂation in our New Keynesian DSGE model.
The traditional New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations generally fails to account for the degree of inﬂation persistence
observed in actual data. Therefore, we speciﬁcally explore the question whether the
underlying labor market regime contributes to explaining inﬂation persistence. In
particular, we analyze how diﬀerent degrees of real wage rigidities aﬀect the reaction
of unemployment and inﬂation to a shock in monetary policy under diﬀerent wage
bargaining regimes. Moreover, we study the impact of a monetary policy shock on
unemployment and inﬂation conditional on labor market fundamentals such as bar-
gaining power of the workers and the ﬂows in and out of employment.
We ﬁnd that rigid real wages contribute to explaining persistent inﬂation. Employing
a right-to-manage bargaining framework, wages feed directly into ﬁrm’s marginal cost
and hence into inﬂation dynamics via the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Introducing
a real wage rigidity in form of a social wage norm, we can show that more rigid
wages translate into more persistent movements of aggregate inﬂation. In contrast,
the channel from wages to inﬂation is missing under the assumption of an eﬃcient
bargaining model and, therefore, fails to generate inﬂation persistence.
Our calibration also shows that unemployment and inﬂation dynamics do not only
depend on rigid wages but also on the parameters that determine employment pro-
tection and bargaining power of workers. Generally, ”institutional” parameters that
raise the volatility in wages, increase also the response of inﬂation and tend to reduce
its persistence. On the other hand, anything that spurs the volatility in labor ﬂows,
dampens the adjustments of wages and, therefore, tends to increase the persistence in
inﬂation.
The model reveals that the labor market has important implications for the trans-
mission process of monetary policy. The inclusion of a labor market into the New
Keynesian model introduces another channel along which real and nominal rigidities
can be incorporated into the model. The ”labor market channel” signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the dynamics of employment and inﬂation. In particular, real wage rigidity appears
to play a key role in shaping marginal cost dynamics and, consequently persistent
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November 2005movement in inﬂation rates. Our model suggests that the central bank may beneﬁt
from closely monitoring the labor market. From the developments in real labor ﬂows
as well as real wage movements the central bank can infer on the dynamics and par-
ticularly, on the degree of persistence of the inﬂation rate. Therefore, diﬀerences in
labor market regimes may help to explain inﬂation dynamics across countries.
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Europe’s labor markets are rigid in many respects. High ﬁring costs, generous un-
employment beneﬁts and strong unions are perceived to contribute to sluggish labor
market adjustments. Moreover, the collective wage bargaining process is seen to pre-
vent wages from adjusting instantaneously, introducing a substantial degree of wage
rigidity. Therefore, rigidities and frictions in the labor market might be crucial for
understanding sluggishness in ﬁrms’ marginal cost and their price setting behavior.
In this paper, we stress the role of the labor market in determining ﬁrms’ marginal
cost and link labor market adjustments directly to the dynamics of inﬂation. For
that reason, we introduce a Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) labor market model
with matching frictions into the New Keynesian business cycle framework, see also
Walsh (2003) and Trigari (2003). We particularly extend the Trigari (2003) model
with right-to-manage wage bargaining to incorporate a real wage rigidity in form of a
Hall (2005) type wage norm. In contrast to the traditional Nash eﬃcient bargaining,
the right-to-manage bargaining constitutes a channel through which wages aﬀect the
marginal costs of ﬁrms. Since marginal costs feed into the determination of prices
through the New Keynesian Phillips curve, we establish a direct channel of real wage
rigidities to translate into aggregate inﬂation.
We speciﬁcally explore the question whether the underlying labor market regime con-
tributes to explaining inﬂation persistence. In particular, we analyze how diﬀerent
degrees of real wage rigidity aﬀect the reaction of unemployment and inﬂation to a
shock in monetary policy under diﬀerent wage bargaining regimes. Moreover, we study
the impact of a monetary policy shock on unemployment and inﬂation conditional on
labor market fundamentals such as bargaining power of the workers and the ﬂows in
and out of employment.
The lack of inﬂation persistence implied by the standard New Keynesian model has
triggered a line of research focusing on ﬁrms’ price setting process. Generally, this
approach accounts for the observed persistence only if a substantial backward-looking
component is included into the Phillips curve relation, see Fuhrer and Moore (1995),
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). A second line
of research focuses on inﬂation persistence stemming from inertia in the underlying
process of marginal costs. Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) introduce Calvo type
7
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and Lopez-Salido (2001) ﬁnd that wage rigidities are a signiﬁcant factor driving the
persistent movement in marginal cost for both the euro area and the U.S..1
Yet, the mere modelling of wage rigidities might not suﬃce to fully understand the
factors behind sluggish marginal cost. Adjustments in the labor market take place on
the hours of work as well as the employment margin. Besides, in light of high levels
of unemployment in Europe and generally rigid labor markets a cleared labor market
neglecting unemployment might be a misleading assumption. In contrast, our model
incorporates matching frictions that generate equilibrium unemployment. Moreover,
workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages in a collective wage bargaining manner. In
addition to adjustments in hours of work per worker, the model provides an additional
adjustment channel via the employment margin. Consequently, we employ a model
with nominal price rigidities that incorporates both real wage rigidities and matching
frictions in the labor market. This model framework will allow us to analyze how labor
market dynamics and particularly the adjustment of wages translate into marginal cost
and inﬂation dynamics.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Our model features a ”labor market
channel” in the monetary transmission mechanism. We can show that the interaction
of the speciﬁc wage setting process, i.e. the right-to-manage bargaining with real wage
rigidities establish a direct channel on aggregate inﬂation dynamics. In particular,
assuming a high degree of wage rigidity induces marginal cost to adjust slowly which
translates into more persistent inﬂation dynamics. In contrast, using an eﬃcient bar-
gaining framework, in which marginal cost are mainly determined by hours worked not
wages, the wage rigidity does not lead to higher inﬂation persistence, see also Krause
and Lubik (2003). Moreover, our calibration shows that unemployment and inﬂation
dynamics depend also on the parameters that determine employment protection and
bargaining power of workers. And ﬁnally, the model is able to describe both the eﬀect
of a monetary policy shock on unemployment and on inﬂation. An adverse monetary
policy shock in our model leads to a negative response of unemployment and inﬂation,
displaying the traditional Phillips curve trade-oﬀ.
The understanding of labor markets for the transmission process might be of crucial
1 See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Edge, Laubach, and Williams (2003) who




Working Paper Series No. 556
November 2005importance for a central bank. First, inﬂation dynamics and hence inﬂationary pres-
sures might depend on the ﬂexibility of wages and labor ﬂows. Second, countries that
diﬀer with respect to their labor market regime might respond quite diﬀerently to a
monetary policy shock. In general, understanding labor market adjustments and how
they are related to the monetary transmission process may reduce the uncertainty
associated with the reaction of inﬂation to a monetary policy action.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the business
cycle model featuring nominal price and real wage rigidities. In Section 3 we analyze
the role of wage rigidities for inﬂation dynamics in our simulated model framework.
Section 4 assesses the impact of labor market fundamentals on inﬂation dynamics.
Section 5 oﬀers some conclusions and provides an outlook for further research.
2 The Business Cycle Model with Labor Market Match-
ing
Following Trigari (2003), we introduce a New Keynesian style business cycle model
incorporating labor market frictions. These labor market frictions are twofold. First,
we use the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model to account for equilibrium unem-
ployment. This imposes a real rigidity on the adjustment of the factors of production
to aggregate shocks. Second, we follow Hall (2005) and Krause and Lubik (2003) by
including real wage rigidity in form of a wage norm. In that sense we extend the
model by Trigari (2003) to allow for rigidities in wage contracts.
The model structure is characterized by a separation between ﬁrms in the wholesale
and retail market. The intermediate goods are produced by competitive ﬁrms in
the wholesale sector employing labor as the only input to production. The retail
sector ﬁrms buy wholesale goods at marginal cost, transform them into diﬀerentiated
goods and sell them with a mark-up over marginal cost in a monopolistic competitive
environment, see Walsh (2003).2
2 The two market structure of wholesale and retail sector simpliﬁes the structure of the model.
Notice that Krause and Lubik (2003) embed the two sector structure into a single integrated ﬁrm
employing labor to produce intermediate and ﬁnal good.
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There is a continuum of households on the interval [0,1]. The representative household
chooses {ct,ht}∞
















where the ﬁrst term is the utility from consuming ct of the ﬁnal good while the second
part represents the disutility from work by supplying ht units of hours. The degree
of risk aversion is given by σ and φ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of labor. κh accounts for the relative importance of disutility of work
and utility from consumption in total utility.









where pt is the aggregate price level, Bt is per capita holdings of one period risk free
bond, rn
t is the gross nominal interest rate on this bond and dt denotes the per capita
income of the household in period t.
Household members can be employed or unemployed. When employed they receive
the wage payments wtht, when unemployed they engage in home production of a non-
tradable goods or receive unemployment beneﬁts which are evaluated in consumption
units, bt. In the absence of perfect income insurance an individual’s savings decision
would depend on its employment history and prospects. To avoid any distributional
issues that may arise from this instance, we follow Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996)
in assuming that households pool their income and consumption. Conditional on this
assumption households optimality conditions can be given by the usual intra- and
intertemporal relation.
2.2 Job Matching
In the following section we lay out the search and matching model of Mortensen-
Pissarides that is incorporated into a New Keynesian style business cycle model to
explicitly model labor market frictions in the form of equilibrium unemployment, see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Pissarides (2000).
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that introduces frictions which lead to imperfect outcomes in the labor market. Jobs
are constantly created and destroyed and unemployed workers look for new jobs gen-
erating unemployment in equilibrium. The process through which workers and ﬁrms
ﬁnd each other is represented by a matching function accounting for the imperfections
and transaction cost in the labor market.3 This function summarizes the entire search
process in a single relation where the number of matches is a function of the number
of unemployed persons, ut, and the number of vacant jobs, vt, in the labor market:





with ̺ being the elasticity of the matching with respect to the stock of unemployed
persons. The parameter ̺m captures all factors that inﬂuence the eﬃciency of match-
ing. The function is assumed to have constant returns to scale.







where θt = vt
ut deﬁnes an indicator for the tightness in the labor market. An increase
in the number of vacancies relative to unemployment, θt, reduces the probability that
a vacancy will be ﬁlled. This in turn means that additional vacancies per unemployed
worker imply an increase of the probability that the unemployed person ﬁnds a job.
Accordingly, the corresponding probability for an unemployed worker to ﬁnd a job is
given by:
st = mt/ut = ̺mθ
1−̺
t (5)
where the exit rate from unemployment is an increasing function of the labor market
tightness. For a given number of unemployed persons in the market, the probability
of ﬁnding a job increases when the number of vacancies rise.
The probabilities of ﬁlling a job and ﬁnding a job show that the matching model
introduces two kinds of externalities responsible for determining equilibrium unem-
ployment in the model: the congestion and the labor market tightness externality.
Each ﬁrm posting a vacancy creates a negative congestion externality for other ﬁrms
3 Frictions usually derive from a complex set of factors such as imperfect information, heterogeneity,
absence of perfect insurance, etc. The matching function incorporates the equilibrium outcome of
such frictions without the explicit reference to the above sources of frictions.
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Conversely, the labor market tightness describes the eﬀect that each additional job
searcher creates a negative search externality for other searchers. Thus, there will be
a stochastic rationing in the labor market which cannot be solved by the usual price
mechanism. The variable, θt, deﬁned to capture both externalities, plays a crucial
role in determining the degree of rationing and hence the equilibrium unemployment
in the labor market.




where labor, i.e. the number of hours, ht, is the only input to production and zt
represents technological progress.
It is assumed that ﬁrms produce the output necessary to provide the aggregate house-
hold demand.
ct = (1 − ρ)ntzthα
t (7)
2.2.1 Job Destruction
Unemployment rises after an adverse shock. According to Hall (2004) employed work-
ers do not loose jobs more frequently in a recession than in other times, i.e. job
destruction remains rather constant over time. On the other hand, employers are far
more reluctant to create jobs in a recession. Hence, unemployment rises because the
exit rate of unemployment is lower, and not because the entrance rate is higher.
Therefore, without loss of plausibility, we can assume that job destruction occurs
exogenously at the rate ρ. The rate ρ indicates the proportion of existing matches that
disappear at the beginning of each period, i.e. become unproductive for unspeciﬁed
reasons resulting in ﬁrms terminating the job.
The number of employed workers at the beginning of each period (nt) evolves as
follows:
nt = (1 − ρ)nt−1 + mt−1 (8)
12
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job destruction process in the previous period and the second part being the matches
formed in the previous period which become productive in the current period. It is
important to note the nt gives the number of employed workers at the beginning of
period t. The number of productive workers in period t is therefore given by (1−ρ)nt.
The number of searching workers is given accordingly as (where total labor force is
normalized to one):4
ut = 1 − (1 − ρ)nt (9)
2.2.2 Job Creation
Firms create a job vacancy when the expected gains from an employment relation
exceed the cost of vacancy posting. Until the value of a new job is equal to the cost
of creating a job new ﬁrms will enter the market to create vacancies. For simplicity
it is assumed that each ﬁrm has one job so vacancy posting and hence the number of
jobs created is a matter of how many ﬁrms are in the market.
The value of a job for a ﬁrm is given by the contemporaneous payoﬀ and the discounted
future value of the job at the end of the period.
Jt = xtf(ht) − wtht + Et βt+1(1 − ρ)Jt+1 (10)
where xt is the relative price of the intermediate good and wt is the wage the ﬁrm
has to pay for an hour of work. Since all the intermediate good producers act in a
competitive environment the relative price is given by marginal cost in relation to the
price of the consumption good. The discount factor is constructed in terms of relative
marginal utility (λt = ∂Ut
∂ct ) from consumption, such that βt+s =
βsλt+s
λt .




+ Et βt+1 [qt(1 − ρ)Jt+1 + (1 − qt)Vt+1] (11)
with κ being the utility cost of vacancy posting.5 When a job is vacant, the proﬁt
is zero. Hence the value of a vacancy is determined by the current cost of holding a
4 Note that ut gives the number of searching workers, while the number of unemployed workers at
the beginning of each period is given by 1 − nt.
5 Notice that the vacancy costs cannot just be seen as the pure costs of hiring but also costs for
machines and other capital that will be idle while the vacancy is not ﬁlled.
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value of a vacancy is greater than zero vacancies are created until Vt = 0.
Taking the diﬀerence between the two equations Jt and Vt yields the surplus, Jt −Vt,
to the ﬁrm of ﬁlling a vacancy. It can be seen from the equations for Jt and Vt that
the value of a ﬁrm from a ﬁlled vacancy increases in the search cost, the separation
rate, the discount rate and the expected length of search.
Turning to the problem of the worker, we assume that a worker can either be employed
or unemployed. The value of being employed is given by:6
Wt = wtht −
g(ht)
λt
+ Et βt+1 [(1 − ρ)Wt+1 + ρUt+1] (12)
The ﬁrst term in the equation is the worker’s wage income. The second term represents
the disutility of work and the last term reﬂects the future utility of an employment
relation. With a probability ρ the job is destroyed and the worker receives the utility
of being unemployed while the value of being employed is realized if the job remains
productive.
In the same way we can express the value of being unemployed:
Ut = b + Et βt+1 [st(1 − ρ)Wt+1 + (1 − st + stρ)Ut+1] (13)
The value of being unemployed is determined by the value of home production or
unemployment beneﬁts, b, and the probability of ﬁnding a job in period t and not
loosing the job at beginning of period t + 1 given by st(1 − ρ). With probability
1 − st(1 − ρ) unemployed workers remain in the unemployment pool, either by being
not matched at all or being matched and separated immediately at the beginning of
the next period.
Taking the diﬀerence between the two equations Wt and Ut yields the surplus, Wt−Ut,
to the worker of staying employed. The surplus depends crucially on the level of
unemployment beneﬁts and the tightness in the labor market.
2.3 Wage Setting
In a frictionless Walrasian labor market, hours are chosen to equate the marginal rate
of substitution between leisure and consumption with the marginal product of labor.




1+φ denotes the disutility from supplying labor.
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matching frictions and equilibrium unemployment, however, the worker and the ﬁrm
bargain over wages. In general, wages will be bargained to split the positive rent
or match surplus arising from a successful match between the worker and the ﬁrm.7
There are several versions of noncooperative bargaining games that are able to solve
the surplus sharing problem. In the following section we will consider the eﬃcient
Nash bargaining to contrast it with the right-to-manage bargaining.
2.3.1 Eﬃcient Nash Bargaining
A plausible way to split the rent between workers and employers is through eﬃcient
Nash bargaining. MacDonald and Solow (1981) proposed a bargaining game in which
bargaining takes place over employment and wages at the same time. In this case,




η [Jt − Vt]
1−η (14)
subject to equations (10) to (13).
This implies the following optimality condition:
ηJt = (1 − η)(Wt − Ut) (15)
The wage in this model can be interpreted as a weighted average of the two ”threat”
points of employers and employees, i.e. the marginal product and the reservation wage,
respectively. The stronger the bargaining power of the worker, the closer the wage is
to the marginal product and vice versa. Therefore, the wage has only a distributive
role of the rent from the foregone expected search costs.


















Notice that in this formulation the wage does not only depend on the marginal rate of
substitution (mrs) as in the frictionless Walrasian market but also on the state of the
labor market, i.e. the value of household production or level of unemployment beneﬁts
7 The rent is generated since it is costly to both workers and employers not to agree over employment.
The worker remains unemployed and has to look for another job and similarly the ﬁrm faces search
costs to ﬁnd another worker.
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of the labor market or higher unemployment beneﬁts implies higher negotiated wages.
In the bargaining process wages and hours are determined simultaneously. This im-
plies that hours are chosen in an eﬃcient way according to the following optimality
condition:
mpltxt = mrst (17)
Under eﬃcient bargaining the outcome lies on the contract curve, i.e. the locus of
tangency points of the isoproﬁt curve of the ﬁrm and worker’s indiﬀerence curves.
Any change in hours will be accompanied by a change in the wage as well so that any
renegotiation of hours and wages will yield an agreement on the contract curve. Thus,
the correct measure of ﬁrms marginal cost is the worker’s marginal rate of substitution
of consumption and leisure rather than the wage.
2.3.2 Right-To-Manage Bargaining
In contrast to eﬃcient Nash bargaining the right-to-manage model proposes that
unions and ﬁrms only bargain over wages and that ﬁrms subsequently choose the
level of employment, see Nickell and Andrews (1983) and Trigari (2003). The reason-
ing to negotiate wages and the employment level separately is that ﬁrms want to adapt
their labor demand if product demand changes. In practise employers are always able
to adjust employment by changing work hours or the workforce. In this view, the
eﬃcient bargaining solution by which every adjustment in working hours is accompa-
nied by a renegotiation of wages seems too restrictive. Besides, a large proportion of
wages in Europe are covered by collective bargaining agreements at the sectoral level,
leaving the individual ﬁrm with the optimal decision on the demand for hours only.
Therefore, the right-to-manage model seems to characterize the institutional setup in
Europe better than the eﬃcient bargaining model.
The product of the weighted economic rents of the negotiating parties, i.e. workers
and employers is maximized with respect to wt:
ηδw
t Jt = (1 − η)δ
f
t (Wt − Ut) (18)
where δw
t = ∂Wt




∂wt is the marginal contribution of the wage to the value of a job to
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wtht = χt(xtzht + fF














t are the future net present values from employment for the ﬁrm and





t + (1 − η)δ
f
t




























As in the eﬃcient bargaining case, the wage diﬀers from the competitive wage. The
wage depends on the respective bargaining power of the negotiating parties, the reser-
vation wage and the general tightness of the labor market. In that sense, the institu-
tional framework of the labor market is crucial for the wage setting process.
Once the wage is determined, ﬁrms will choose hours to satisfy the relation:
xtmplt = wt (21)
Wages are set through the bargaining process and are taken as given by the ﬁrms
when choosing their level of employment. For every additional hour of work the
ﬁrm must pay the previously bargained wage. Therefore, in contrast to the eﬃcient
bargaining case, the wage is now a direct determinant of the ﬁrm’s marginal cost. The
mechanism through which wages feed into marginal costs is crucial to our model since
it constitutes a direct channel of wages on inﬂation dynamics via the New Keynesian
Phillips curve.
2.3.3 Introducing Wage Rigidity
Aggregate wages are characterized by a high degree of persistence. Especially in
Europe, sudden and signiﬁcant shifts in the aggregate wage level are not observed.
Due to collective wage bargaining agreements, wage changes only take place on a quite
17
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a degree of wage ﬂexibility that is hardly consistent with actual practises.
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
introduce wage rigidity into the New Keynesian business cycle model by a Calvo type
wage setting scheme. As in ﬁnal good price setting, ﬁrms are randomly chosen to
change their wages while the remaining ﬁrms keep wages unchanged. In Europe,
however, most wages are bargained on a sector wide level, are not allowed to ﬂuctuate
freely and once settled remain unchanged for a given period. More importantly, the
Calvo wage rigidity modelling strategy neglects the crucial interdependence of the
wage bargaining process with other labor market issues, like the ﬂows in and out of
employment or the level of unemployment. For that reason we opt for introducing a
wage rigidity into the labor market setting presented in the previous sections.8
Following Hall (2005), we introduce wage rigidity into the model in the form of a
backward looking social norm.9 The possible outcome of the wage bargain lies within
a bargaining set. The bargaining set is bounded by an upper limit denoting the wage
rate (w
(u)
t ) for which the ﬁrms’s surplus from the employment relation is zero. The
wage level for which the worker is indiﬀerent between working and being unemployed
determines the lower wage bound (w
(l)
t ).10 All wage levels in this bargaining set are
possible solutions of the wage bargain and can be written as a convex combination of




t + (1 − Γt)w
(l)
t (22)
where Γt is a function of the speciﬁc bargaining regime governed by η.
According to Hall (2005) a wage norm or social consensus can be perceived as a rule to
select an equilibrium within the bargaining set. Without going into the details of the
sources of this wage norm, we assume that the actual wage level is given by a weighted
8 Throughout this paper we are using the term wage rigidity to refer to the general property that
real wages are not adjusting immediately to the desired level. In contrast to this usage Trigari
(2003) is using the term wage rigidity for the right-to-manage bargaining approach where wages
are allocative but free to adjust immediately (compare Section 2.3.2).
9 The wage norm has originally been introduced into the matching model to improve the model’s
performance in replicating labor market ﬂuctuations. In particular, the model cannot explain well
the magnitude of the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies, see e.g. Hall (2005) and
Shimer (2005). A wage norm limits the adjustment capabilities of wages and hence increases the
adjustments on the labor quantity side. This channel substantially increases the business cycle
ﬂuctuations of unemployment and vacancies.
10 The upper and the lower limit of the wage bargaining set are derived from the value functions
deﬁned in equations (10) and (11) respectively (12) and (13).
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wt = (1 − δ)w⋆
t + δ   w (23)
where   w = wt−1 and δ denoting the respective weight. The wage norm used in this
framework can be seen as encompassing various sources of wage rigidities.12 While
being a short cut to a micro founded wage rigidity, the aggregate wage norm used
in this paper constitutes a plausible starting point for analyzing the impact of wage
rigidities on the monetary transmission process, see also Krause and Lubik (2003),
Uhlig (2004) and Blanchard and Gali (2005), which take a similar approach.
In contrast to the eﬃcient bargaining model, the right-to-manage model of the previous
section establishes a link between the wage setting and ﬁrms’ marginal cost. In fact,
in our model the wage rigidity will directly inﬂuence the marginal cost process.13 In a
New Keynesian model with a Walrasian labor market an adverse shock to production
usually leads to large declines in real wages. Marginal costs of ﬁrms fall accordingly
and the incentive for price adjustments is high. This is, however, in contrast to the
empirical evidence that commonly demonstrates ﬂuctuations of prices and wages to
be rather small. Hence, the departure from the Walrasian labor market with wage
rigidities may improve the model generated dynamics of output and inﬂation. More
speciﬁcally, the introduction of the wage norm depresses marginal cost ﬂuctuations and
helps to generate more persistent inﬂation dynamics via the New Keynesian Phillips
curve.
2.4 Final Good Firms and Price Setting
The ﬁnal good ﬁrms aggregate the intermediate goods into the ﬁnal consumption
good.14 The output index is assembled using the standard aggregation technology.
yt =









11 The wage norm can be rationalized, for example, in terms of an aggregation of individual wage
decisions, each subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks disturbing the wage outcome. Only
those wages that fall out of the boundaries of the wage bargaining set are reset to the nearest
boundary. In general, the average wage in a period becomes the norm for next period, see Hall
(2003) for details.
12 See for example Boeri and Burda (2003) or Danthine and Kurmann (2004) for possible microfoun-
dations.
13 Notice that the wage rigidity in this model does not aﬀect the formation of a match itself. However,
a wage rigidity inﬂuences the vacancy posting of employers as slow moving wages aﬀect the proﬁt
condition and hence the amount of open vacancies posted by ﬁrms.
14 This section follows the standard setting described in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
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own price elasticity, respectively. The ﬁnal good is sold at its unit price deﬁned as
pt =
























where (1 − ϕ) denotes the per period probability that a ﬁrm is able to reset its price
to the optimal price p⋆
t. The remaining fraction ϕ of ﬁrms keep their prices at the
levels prevailed in the previous period. The optimal price p⋆
t is chosen to maximize



























with Rit denoting the real interest rate.
2.5 Monetary Policy
The central bank’s monetary policy is modelled via a Taylor-type interest rate rule
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To solve the model described in the previous section the equations are linearized
around the model’s steady state. The resulting linearized system is solved using
AIM.15 In order to analyze the dynamics of our model we calibrate the model choosing
parameter values that are generally used in the literature. The benchmark parameter
choices are displayed in Table 2.
In this section we analyze the model’s dynamics to a unit shock in monetary policy,
i.e. an increase in the nominal interest rate. We are particularly interested in how
monetary policy is propagated in the presence of a non-Walrasian labor market with
equilibrium unemployment and real wage rigidity. Towards that aim, we will compare
the outcome of the model under the two bargaining schemes introduced in the previous
sections, i.e. the eﬃcient Nash bargaining and the right-to-manage bargaining. This
allows the analysis of the transmission process of monetary policy when labor markets
diﬀer with respect to the bargaining regime as well as to the degree of wage rigidity.
The results regarding the impact of wage rigidity on the variables of interest crucially
depend on the prevailing bargaining regime.
3.1 Eﬃcient Bargaining Setup
As a ﬁrst step, we analyze the impact of wage rigidity when combined with an eﬃcient
Nash bargaining setup. The corresponding impulse-response functions are displayed
in Figure 1. An adverse interest rate shock initially leads to a fall in private de-
mand. In order to adjust to private demand, intermediate good producers reduce
production, implying a fall in employment and working hours. A dampened demand
decreases expected proﬁts and hence induces ﬁrms to post less vacancies. Vacancies
fall and unemployment increases accordingly. Since working hours must fall to meet
the reduced demand, ﬁrms pay lower wages to reduce worker’s labor supply.
The drop in consumption implies an increase in the current period’s marginal utility of
consumption. The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption falls
accordingly. In Section 2.3.1 it was highlighted that the marginal rate of substitution
is an important determinant of ﬁrms’ marginal costs. As can be seen in Figure 1, a
15 See Anderson and Moore (1985) for details on the solution method.
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Additionally, inﬂation falls also since marginal costs subsequently aﬀect inﬂation via
the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
The introduction of real wage rigidity in the eﬃcient bargaining model increases the
adjustment via the employment margin. Under rigid wages, changes in demand con-
ditions have a stronger impact on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. If wages cannot decrease
suﬃciently, ﬁrms are paying excessive wage compensation. This implies a negative
impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁts, a reduced number of posted vacancies and an additional
reduction in employment. The path of hours, however, is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected,
which implies that inﬂation dynamics are not strongly inﬂuenced by the introduction
of wage rigidity.16
3.2 Right-to-Manage Bargaining Setup
As a second step, we analyze how the model dynamics change when workers and ﬁrms
bargain according to a right-to-manage (RTM) bargaining regime. We are particularly
interested in the responses of the variables when a wage rigidity is introduced into the
RTM model. For that reason we compare the response functions of a RTM model
without wage rigidity with a calibration using a high degree of wage stickiness. The
corresponding impulse-response functions are shown in Figure 2.
The initial reactions to a monetary policy shock without a wage norm are quite similar
to the responses in the eﬃcient bargaining model. A noteworthy diﬀerence is that
wages react much stronger in the RTM model and labor ﬂows are much less pronounced
than in the eﬃcient bargaining version. The increased volatility of wages can be
explained by a steeper labor demand function in the right-to-manage setup.
The introduction of wage rigidity in the RTM model has an important implication for
the dynamics of inﬂation in the model, see Figure 2. Indeed, the introduction of wage
rigidities reduce the volatility and increase the persistence of wages. Accordingly, as
it is apparent from the ﬁgure, marginal costs and inﬂation also show a more persistent
response to a monetary policy shock. Therefore, we can show that for a reasonable
degree of wage rigidity the model improves signiﬁcantly along the inﬂation persistence
margin.
16 This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of Krause and Lubik (2003).
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on inﬂation dynamics through the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The mechanism of
wage rigidities in the right-to-manage framework can be best seen in the linearized
version of the wage and inﬂation equation:17
wt = (1 − δ)(γ1mrst + γ2(vt − ut − ht − λt))
−(1 − δ)(γ3ht − ζ1χt + ζ2 E(χt+1)) + δwt−1 (32)
πt =
(1 − βϕ)(1 − ϕ)
ϕ
(wt − (α − 1)ht) + β E(πt+1) (33)
It is obvious from Equation (32) that the inclusion of wage rigidities smooth the path
of wages. Wages in turn determine ﬁrms’ marginal costs and thus directly feed into the
path of inﬂation, see Equation (33). Therefore, the wage rigidity smoothes marginal
costs and increases inﬂation persistence. Moreover, since in our model not only hours
but also employment adjusts to economic shocks, the ﬂuctuations of hours can be
smaller than in a model without the employment margin. This implies that marginal
costs may be further smoothed by a less variable hours component. Therefore, the
modelling of ﬂows in and out of employment in our model can have further implications
for the dynamics of marginal costs and hence inﬂation.
Table 1 displays the inﬂation and wage persistence from model simulations when
labor markets diﬀer with respect to the bargaining regime as well as the degree of
wage rigidity. The four columns show the persistence in wages and inﬂation from the
model simulated series. Persistence is measured as the sum of the AR coeﬃcients of
the respective lagged dependent variable from a univariate autoregressive process, see
Andrews and Chen (1994).18
The upper panel in Table 1 shows the model series persistence within a RTM bargain-
ing framework and the lower panel the eﬃcient bargaining counterparts. It is apparent
17 Where χt =
η  δw(1−  χ)
η  χ  δw+(1−η)  χ  hδ
w
t −
(1−η)  χ  h
(η  χ  δw+(1−η)  χ  h)δ
f
t , variables with a hat denote the steady state



























1−η(1 − ˆ s)
κ




18 The most common approach to determine a variable’s persistence is to estimate a univariate AR
equation of the following form:




where ς corresponds to the sum of the AR coeﬃcients of the lagged dependent variables. See e.g.
Gadzinski and Orlandi (2003) for further evidence and alternative measures on inﬂation persistence
in the euro area.
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Bargaining Persistence Model Model Model Model.
Regime ς in δ = 0 δ = 0.90 δ = 0.95 δ = 0.97
Right to Manage
Wages 0.36 0.81 0.88 0.92
Inﬂation 0.38 0.71 0.77 0.78
Eﬃcient Bargaining
Wages 0.52 0.92 0.95 0.97
Inﬂation 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16
Notes: δ is the coeﬃcient of lagged wages in the wage equation.
from the table that the greater the exogenously imposed wage rigidity, the higher is
inﬂation persistence in the RTM model. For wage norms consistent with aggregate
wage data (e.g. an AR coeﬃcient of 0.9) the RTM model generates substantial inﬂa-
tion persistence compared to model variants with no wage norm. In contrast, inﬂation
persistence under the eﬃcient bargaining framework is not aﬀected signiﬁcantly when
the degree of wage rigidity increases. In the eﬃcient bargaining model there is no
direct channel from wages to ﬁrms’ marginal costs. Obviously, this prevents wages
from aﬀecting inﬂation in a signiﬁcant way.
To sum up, the introduction of RTM bargaining with real wage rigidities has important
implications for the transmission of monetary policy in the traditional New Keynesian
model. A non-clearing labor market together with wage rigidities help to explain a
more persistent response of inﬂation to a shock in interest rates.
4 The Impact of Labor Market Fundamentals
European labor markets are governed by labor market institutions such as collec-
tive wage bargaining, employment protection legislation and unemployment insurance.
These institutions may be seen to inﬂuence the bargaining power of workers which in
turn aﬀect the wage determination process. In this section we look at the responses
of unemployment and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock under diﬀerent degrees of
labor market rigidity in the RTM model with wage rigidity.19 The wage equation in
the right-to-manage model in Section 2.3.2 contains several variables characterizing
the state of the labor market such as the bargaining power of workers, the job de-
19 The notion of the interaction between shocks and institutions was forwarded by e.g. Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) to statistically explain the evolution of European unemployment.
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the wage outcome and inﬂation dynamics, the question arises how the determinants
of the wage itself aﬀect inﬂation dynamics.20
4.1 Bargaining Power of Workers
Collective wage bargaining is an important institutional feature that determines wages
of workers. For example, despite a relatively low union density, union coverage is fairly
high in most of Continental European countries, see e.g. Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel, and
Quintini (2003). Generally, higher bargaining power of workers in the form of higher
union membership and coverage is associated with an upward pressure on wages and
hence higher unemployment.21
We start with analyzing inﬂation and unemployment dynamics with diﬀerent degrees
of workers’ bargaining power represented by the parameter, η, see Figure 3.22 If
bargaining power is high the negotiated wage increases since workers can command
higher wages for a given disutility of work. Thus, expected proﬁts of ﬁrms decline and
cause the number of vacant jobs to fall. This in turn results in higher unemployment.
In line with the empirical evidence provided by e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), the
interaction of a monetary policy shock and high bargaining power leads to an increase
in unemployment in our model.
Higher bargaining power of workers induces inﬂation to respond more to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock, see Figure 3. When wages increase with higher bar-
gaining power, marginal costs rise as well and feed into increased movements of in-
ﬂation. A change in bargaining power aﬀects both the magnitude of the response in
unemployment and inﬂation and the persistence of the respective variables. Notice,
however, that an increase in bargaining power does not only feeds into larger upward
wage movements in the case of a positive demand shock, but due to the symmetry
of the model, also to larger wage declines when the shock is negative. Therefore,
20 Note that there have been a set of theoretical studies on the impact of labor market institutions
such as hiring subsidies and unemployment beneﬁts on labor market dynamics, see e.g. Yashiv
(2004).
21 Yet, in practise this eﬀect can be oﬀset if wage setting in the economy is coordinated, see e.g.
Nickell and Layard (1999).
22 The baseline parameter choice for bargaining power is η = 0.4 which is a conservative assumption
on rents accruing to the workers. Much empirical work has of course been devoted to estimating
bargaining power within a wage equation framework. For example Abowd and Lemieux (1993)
estimated a workers’ share of rents of about 30% in Canada.
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thus larger responses in inﬂation.
4.2 Employment Protection
European labor markets are characterized by lower job turnover rates than their U.S.
counterpart, see e.g. Burda and Wyplosz (1994).23 This is conventionally interpreted
as stemming from higher employment protection and ﬁring costs in Europe. On the
one hand, employment protection leads ﬁrms to be more cautious in ﬁlling vacancies
and on the other hand reduces involuntary separations. Lower job ﬂows in our model
correspond to a lower job destruction rate. For that reason we model employment
protection simply through its eﬀect on aggregate job ﬂows. This neglects, however,
the direct eﬀect of employment protection on the bargaining position of workers and
hence the impact on wages.
Figure 4 displays the responses of unemployment and inﬂation to a monetary policy
shock when we vary the rate of exogenous job destruction. In a regime with lower
job turnover, i.e. lower job destruction rates, unemployment reacts less to an adverse
interest rate shock since aggregate labor ﬂows are lower.24 A lower job destruction
rate reduces aggregate job creation and elevates the volatility in real wages.25 Larger
adjustments on the wage margin dampen aggregate wage persistence. The response
of inﬂation to a monetary policy shock appears to be more pronounced and less per-
sistent. This in turn means that in the case of high aggregate labor ﬂows, wage
adjustments tend to be small and thus translate into smaller and more persistent
movements of the inﬂation rate.26
The analysis has shown that any ”institutional” parameter that raises the volatility
in wages, increases also the response of inﬂation and tends to reduce its persistence.
On the other hand, anything that spurs the volatility in labor ﬂows dampens the
adjustments of wages and, therefore, tends to increase the persistence in inﬂation.
23 A prominent exception is, however, the comparison of the U.S. and the Portuguese labor ﬂows as
documented in Blanchard and Portugal (2001).
24 Note that the empirical evidence of a relationship between employment protection and unemploy-
ment is rather mixed, see e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999).
25 Notice that the eﬀect on wages would be potentially larger if we had a direct channel of employment
protection on the bargained wage outcome in our model.
26 In a similar vein, an increase in the natural rate of unemployment surges equilibrium job ﬂows.
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this model. Employment protection as well as bargaining power are usually associated
with exerting an upward pressure on wages with downward rigidity at the same time.
Since in our model wages react symmetrically, higher bargaining power results in
stronger wage increases in the case of a positive shock and in larger reductions in the
case of a negative shock, respectively. A better account of labor market institutions
and their implications for unemployment and inﬂation dynamics in this model, is a
task to be taken up in further research.
5 Conclusions
We include a labor market with wage rigidities as well as matching frictions into
the New Keynesian model. In particular, we follow the approach by Trigari (2003)
assuming that workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages according to a right-to-manage
bargaining model. We extend the Trigari setting by incorporating wage rigidity into
the right-to-manage bargaining framework which has important implications for the
joint dynamics of unemployment and inﬂation in our New Keynesian DSGE model.
The model sheds light on the question whether the speciﬁc form of wage bargaining
and the degree of wage rigidity aﬀects the transmission process of monetary policy
determining inﬂation dynamics.
The traditional New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations generally fails to account for the degree of inﬂation persistence
observed in actual data. Employing a right-to-manage bargaining framework, wages
feed directly into ﬁrm’s marginal cost and hence into inﬂation dynamics via the New
Keynesian Phillips curve. Introducing a wage rigidity in form of a Hall type wage
norm, we can show that more rigid wages translate into more persistent movements
of aggregate inﬂation. In contrast, the channel from wages to inﬂation is missing un-
der the assumption of an eﬃcient bargaining model and, therefore, fails to generate
inﬂation persistence.
Our calibration also shows that unemployment and inﬂation dynamics do not only
depend on rigid wages but also on the parameters that determine employment protec-
tion, bargaining power of workers and the natural rate of unemployment. Generally,
”institutional” parameters that raise the volatility in wages, increase also the response
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the volatility in labor ﬂows, dampens the adjustments of wages and, therefore, tends
to increase the persistence in inﬂation.
The model reveals that the labor market has important implications for the trans-
mission process of monetary policy. The inclusion of a labor market into the New
Keynesian model introduces another channel along which real and nominal rigidities
can be incorporated into the model. The ”labor market channel” signiﬁcantly aﬀects
the dynamics of employment and inﬂation. In particular, real wage rigidity appears
to play a key role in shaping marginal cost dynamics and, consequently persistent
movement in inﬂation rates. Our model suggests that the central bank may beneﬁt
from closely monitoring the labor market. From the developments in real labor ﬂows
as well as real wage movements the central bank can infer on the dynamics and par-
ticularly, on the degree of persistence of the inﬂation rate. Therefore, diﬀerences in
labor market regimes may help to explain inﬂation dynamics across countries.
The theoretical results in our paper depend on the speciﬁc parameter choice in the
model’s calibration. In a companion paper, Christoﬀel, K¨ uster, and Linzert (2005),
the parameters of the model are estimated to make a quantitative assessment of the
model. In particular, we analyze the role of labor labor market rigidities for the
transmission of monetary policy. The estimated model allows us to make explicit
statements on the importance of wage rigidities for inﬂation dynamics. Moreover, we
shed light on the relevance of labor market shocks for business cycle dynamics and
monetary policy in particular.
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Table 2: Calibration for Benchmark Model without Wage Rigidity (δ = 0)
Parameter Description Value
δ Exogenously imposed wage rigidity 0
ρm AR coeﬃcient in monetary policy rule 0.9
γπ Coeﬃcient on πt+1 in monetary policy rule 1.5
γy Coeﬃcient on yt in monetary policy rule 0.5
σ Coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion 1.5
ϕ 1 − ϕ: reset prob in stagg. price setting 0.68
β Time discount factor 0.99
α Labor elasticity in production funct. 0.667
φ Disutility of work 5
̺ Exponent in matching function 0.9
̺m Scaling factor in matching function 0.4
ρ Exogenous separation rate 0.08
η Bargaining power 0.5
n Steady-state non-employed workers 0.2
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November 2005Figure 1: Impulse-Response Functions of a Monetary Policy Shock from Calibrated Model in
an Eﬃcient Bargaining Regime











(a) Response of Marginal Cost













(b) Response of Real Wages









(c) Response of Vacancies















(d) Response of Unemployment











(e) Response of Hours of Work











(f) Response of Inﬂation
Notes: The dashed line corresponds to the impulse-responses of the eﬃcient bargaining without
exogenously imposed wage rigidity, i.e. δ = 0, see Equation (23). The solid line displays the
impulse-response function of the eﬃcient bargaining model with wage rigidity of δ = 0.9. Notice
that this is not an implausible value as it corresponds to an estimated AR(1) coeﬃcient for an
univariate real wage equation for U.S. and German data.
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(a) Response of Marginal Cost











(b) Response of Real Wages













(c) Response of Vacancies












(d) Response of Unemployment











(e) Response of Hours of Work












(f) Response of Inﬂation
Notes: The dashed line corresponds to the impulse-responses of the right-to-manage model
without exogenously imposed wage rigidity, i.e. δ = 0, see Equation (23). The solid line displays
the impulse-response function of the right to manage model with wage rigidity of δ = 0.9. Notice
that this is not an implausible value as it corresponds to an estimated AR(1) coeﬃcient for an
univariate real wage equation for U.S. and German data.
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Notes: The dashed line corresponds to the impulse-responses of the right-to-manage model with
wage rigidity of δ = 0.9. The solid line displays the impulse-response function of the model with
a decrease from 0.5 to 0.03 in worker’s bargaining power.
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with Lower Job Destruction

























Notes: The dashed line corresponds to the impulse-responses of the right-to-manage model with
wage rigidity of δ = 0.9. The solid line displays the impulse-response function of the model with
job destruction lowered from 8 percent to 0.1 percent.
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